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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARTY JOE GALVAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20050005-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from sentences for theft, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, and attempted simple assault, a class A misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102, in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable John Paul Kennedy presiding.1 This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. A substitute prosecutor, unaware of the State's plea bargain agreement to 
recommend probation with jail time, appeared at sentencing and recommended prison. 
When defense counsel explained the problem, the prosecutor withdrew the 
recommendation and instead recommended probation. The trial court then imposed 
1
 Unless otherwise stated, all citations to the code are to the West 2004 
publication. 
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sentence. Is defendant entitled to resentencing by a new judge where the prosecutor 
cured any inadvertent breach of the plea agreement before sentencing? 
To prevail on this unpreserved claim, defendant must establish plain error. He 
must show (1) that an error occurred; (2) that the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court; and (3) that the error was prejudicial. See State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55,141, 
82P.3dll06. 
2. Did the trial court have jurisdiction to rule on defendant's 22(e) motion? 
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. State v. One 1980 Cadillac, 2001 UT 26, f 8, 21 P.3d 212. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: "The court may correct 
an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with robbery, a second degree felony, and attempted theft, 
a third degree felony. R2-3. Defendant waived preliminary hearing, and defendant was 
bound over as charged. R47. 
Defendant pled no contest to theft, a third degree felony, and attempted simple 
assault, a class A misdemeanor. R51. The section of the plea statement entitled "plea 
agreement" states: "At sentencing, the [S]tate recommends jail time on the Class A with 
completion of CATS or a release to an intensive inpatient program. At the end of 
successful probation, the [S]tate does not oppose a 76-3-402 reduction." R60. The 
notification of charges section has this footnote: "The [Sjtate amends the Information to 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
charge the two offenses listed above, and defendant pleads as charged to the amended 
offenses. State recommends probation." R56. Defendant acknowledged in his plea 
statement that any sentencing recommendation was not binding on the trial court. Id. 
The trial court accepted the plea. R63. The court also ordered Adult Probation & 
Parole (AP&P) to prepare a presentence investigation report (PSI). R51. 
At sentencing, Paul Parker appeared for the State, substituting for prosecutor Kelly 
Sheffield, who had negotiated the plea agreement. R146 (December 6, 2004 Sentencing) 
at 18. Mr. Parker noted that the PSI detailed defendant's "long and extensive" and 
"violen[t]" criminal history and his poor record in probation settings. Id. at 23-24. He 
further observed, "[I]t looks to me like [defendant] needs to be in prison, as the pre-
sentence report has indicated." Id. at 24. Defendant then made his statement. Id. at 24-
25. 
The trial court then asked if there was any reason the court should not proceed 
with sentencing. Id. at 25-26. Defense counsel responded, "[TJhere's no legal reason not 
to proceed with sentencing; however, I need to make a couple of observations I want on 
the record." Id. at 26. He continued, "If you look at the first page of the change-of-plea 
form,. .. Mr. Sheffield's position was that [defendant] should plead to one third and 
[one] Class A. In exchange for that, the State would recommend probation with AP&P, 
with appropriate jail time." Id. He observed that the position that Mr. Parker had taken 
was "contrary to the official plea bargain position from the district attorney's office, and 
apparently Mr. Parker did not know that because Mr. Sheffield didn't leave the relevant 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
note to him." Id. He asked the court to "take judicial notice" of "the official state's 
position in this case at the time the plea was negotiated." Id. 
At that point, Mr. Parker interrupted. He said, "I think I do need to make that 
amendment because it clearly says on the plea form . . . that the State would make a 
recommendation of probation. Id. at 27. He continued, "I do not have that in the file, but 
we need to stabilize] our agreement to make that recommendation, and I will withdraw 
my comments and make an affirmative recommendation of probation." Id. 
Defense counsel added, "In addition to that, your Honor, Mr. Sheffield was not 
opposed, eventually, to a 402 reduction on the third to a Class A if [defendant] performed 
well on probation." Id. at 27. He summarized, "[A]gain Fm asking that the Court follow 
basically the joint recommendation of the State and the defense and allow probation to go 
forward consistent with where [defendant] fits on AP&P's matrix." Id. at 28. 
The court then responded, "Well, Fm not obligated to follow your 
recommendation. Ordinarily I have been following recommendations, but in this 
instance I see a record of probably twenty or so situations where the defendant is 
involved in assault or some kind of abuse in his record." Id. "I just don't feel that, 
regardless of what [the] agreement was with Mr. Sheffield," and regardless of the 
victim's "pretty dramatic statement" about defendant's violent behavior, "[e]ven setting 
those aside and not weighing those in the balance, my inclination would still be to 
sentence the defendant at this time to zero to five years in the state prison." Id. 
Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to zero to five years in prison on his felony 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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conviction. Id. The court also sentenced defendant to one year in jail on his class A 
misdemeanor conviction and ordered that the sentences run consecutively. Id. 
On December 3, 2004, defendant timely appealed from his sentences. Id. at 76. 
Current counsel then appeared and moved for an order vacating defendant's sentence 
pursuant to rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and transferring the case to 
another court for resentencing. R82, 84. On March 3, 2005, the trial court entered an 
order ruling that the December 3, 2004 notice of appeal deprived it of jurisdiction to hear 
defendant's rule 22(e) motion. Rl39-40. Defendant timely appealed that order. R142. 
On March 14, 2005, this Court consolidated the two appeals. R144. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
Defendant had been drinking "all day and ni[ght]" in the hours preceding the June 
27, 2004 offense. PSI at 4. That Sunday morning, at approximately 3:30 a.m., he took a 
cab to a Salt Lake City grocery store. Id. at 3. Shortly thereafter, store employee 
Lonnetta Lopshire saw defendant "walk out of the store with a grocery cart containing 
four cases of beer." PSI at 3. Realizing that beer could not be sold legally at that hour, 
she tried to stop defendant. Id. "[Defendant 'punched' Ms. Lopshire in the face, and 
again on the side of the head." Id. After she had fallen to the ground, "he continued to 
batter [her] while [she was] on the ground." R146 (December 6, 2004 Sentencing) at 22. 
This statement relies on the factual summary of the offense and on defendant's 
statement, both included in the PSI, and on the victim's account of the offense at 
sentencing. See PSI at 3-4; R146 (December 6,2004 Sentencing) at 22-23. 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The cab driver, having witnessed the incident, got out of his car and took the keys 
with him. P SI at 3. He saw defendant drop one case of beer and put the other three into 
the cab. Id. Defendant then tried to drive away. Id. When he could not, he left on foot. 
Id. 
Police apprehended defendant the following day. Id. at 4. He later stated that he 
"[w]as intoxicated, went to [the] store in [a] cab[,] walked out with 4 cases of beer[,] got 
into [an] altercation[, and] fled the scene." Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court did not plainly err when it sentenced defendant, and defendant is 
not entitled to resentencing. Although the substitute prosecutor may initially have 
breached the plea agreement, he cured any breach before sentence was imposed. 
Moreover, defendant has not shown that the trial court relied on the State's initial 
recommendation when it imposed sentence or that he was denied the benefit of his 
bargain. 
2. The trial court properly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to address defendant's 
rule 22(e) motion to vacate. First, defendant had already filed an appeal raising the very 
issue he attempted to raise in his rule 22(e) motion. While rule 22(e) permits a defendant 
to attack an illegal sentence at any time and in any forum, it does not permit a defendant 
to repeatedly challenge his sentence on the same legal basis. Defendant chose to raise his 
breach-of-plea challenge to his sentence in the appellate courts. That choice deprived the 
district court of jurisdiction to simultaneously address the same issue. Second, because 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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defendant's sentence was both legal and legally imposed, rule 22(e) did not confer upon 
the trial court jurisdiction to address the claims raised in the motion. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that he was deprived of "the benefit of his plea bargain" and 
asks for "resentencing before a different judge." Br. Appellant at 6. Defendant did not 
preserve this claim below and does not argue exceptional circumstances or plain error on 
appeal. Defendant, in fact, invited the very error he now claims on appeal. This Court 
should therefore decline to review this claim. In any case, defendant has not shown that 
the trial court plainly erred when it sentenced him or that he was deprived of the benefit 
of his plea bargain. Thus, he is not entitled to resentencing. 
After filing a notice of appeal from his sentence, defendant filed a motion to 
vacate his sentence in the trial court, arguing that the sentence was illegal or illegally 
imposed in violation of rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court 
ruled that defendant's filing of the initial notice of appeal deprived the court of 
jurisdiction to entertain the motion. That ruling was proper. Defendant had already filed 
an appeal raising the very issue he attempted to raise in his rule 22(e) motion, thereby 
depriving the district court of jurisdiction to address the same claim. Moreover, because 
defendant's sentence was both legal and legally imposed, rule 22(e) did not confer upon 
the trial court jurisdiction to address the claims raised in the motion. 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I. 
DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF HIS PLEA BARGAIN; 
EVEN ASSUMING THE STATE INITIALLY BREACHED THE 
PLEA AGREEMENT, THE STATE CURED THE BREACH 
A. Defendant did not preserve this claim. 
Defendant claims that he was deprived of the "benefit of his plea bargain" when 
the trial judge imposed sentence after the substitute prosecutor had initially recommended 
prison. Br. Appellant at 6-7. Defendant did not preserve this claim below. 
It is well-settled that "claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, H 11, 10 P.3d 346. See also State v. Thomas, 
1999 UT 2, H 29, 974 P.2d 269 ("Absent any indication that this issue was raised at trial, 
it cannot be considered for the first time on appeal"); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 
1022 (Utah 1996) (declining to address claims not raised in the trial court). To preserve 
an issue for appeal, a defendant "must enter an objection on the record that is both timely 
and specific." State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah App. 1993). "The preservation 
requirement is based on the premise that, 'in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial 
court ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, 
correct it.'" State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, If 33, P.3d (quoting Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, Tj 11, 10 P.3d 346) (additional internal quotations omitted). "Accordingly, an 
objection "must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial [court] can 
consider it.'" Id. (quoting State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 356, 361 (Utah App. 1993) 
(additional internal quotations omitted). In other words, "[t]he objection must 'be 
specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error' of which counsel [or 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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defendant] complains." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting 
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App. 1996)). 
Here, defendant did not claim below that he had been denied the benefit of his plea 
bargain or that he was entitled to sentencing before a different judge. Defense counsel 
did not object to Judge Kennedy's imposing sentence after the substitute prosecutor 
stated that "it look[ed]... like [defendant] need[ed] to be in prison." R146 (December 6, 
2004 Sentencing) at 24. Rather, defense counsel asked the court to take judicial notice 
that "the official state's position in this case at the time the plea was negotiated" included 
an agreement to recommend probation. Id, at 26. Following defense counsel's request, 
the substitute prosecutor acknowledged his error, withdrew his comments, and "ma[de] 
an affirmative recommendation of probation." Id. at 27. 
Defense counsel was satisfied by the prosecutor's cure. Defense counsel therefore 
did not object to sentence being imposed by Judge Kennedy. Defendant never claimed 
that the prosecution's initial breach of the plea bargain tainted the proceedings or 
required sentencing before a different judge. Defendant thus waived below the claim he 
now makes on appeal. 
B. Defendant invited the very error he now claims on appeal. 
Where a defendant does not preserve his claim below, he must show "plain error" 
to prevail on appeal. See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). The plain error 
doctrine "exists to permit review of trial court rulings as a way of protecting a defendant 
from the harm that can be caused by less-than-perfect counsel." State v. Bullock, 791 
P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989). 
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Plain error review, however, does not lie when a party, through counsel, 
consciously refrains from objecting or has led the trial court into error. Id.; State v. 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,19, 86 P.3d 742 (holding, in context of challenge to jury 
instruction, that "a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that 
party led the trial court into committing the error"). A defendant invites error "if counsel, 
either by statement or act, affirmatively represents] to the court that he or she had no 
objection" to the court's act or decision. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, \ 9 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Thus, "'invited error . . . is procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor, 
especially where ample opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a result.'" State v. 
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284-85 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 
560-61 (Utah 1987)). Otherwise, a criminal defendant could 'invite' prejudicial error and 
"implant it in the record as a form of appellate insurance . . . . " Id. 
Defendant invited the very error he now claims on appeal. Before the trial court 
sentenced defendant, the court asked the parties if there was any reason why it should not 
proceed with sentencing. R146 (December 6, 2004 Sentencing) at 26. Defendant stated, 
"Your Honor, there's no legal reason not to proceed with sentencing; however, I need to 
make a couple of observations I want on the record." Id. Defendant did not ask the court 
to continue sentencing. Defendant did not argue that the court, having heard the 
prosecutor's initial recommendation, could not or should not impose sentence. Rather, 
defendant only wanted the court to be aware of the original bargain before it imposed 
sentence. See id. Indeed, after the prosecutor had withdrawn his initial recommendation 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and had affirmatively recommended probation, defense counsel asked the court to 
proceed on the basis of "the joint recommendation of the State and of the defense." Id. at 
28. 
Moreover, as a matter of policy, this Court should not allow defendant to preview 
the trial court's sentencing decision and then argue that no sentencing should have 
occurred. Having affirmatively represented that there was no legal reason not to proceed 
with sentencing, defendant should not be permitted to now claim, for the first time on 
appeal, that the trial court erred when it imposed sentence. 
C. Defendant has not alleged, much less shown, that the trial court plainly erred 
when it sentenced defendant after the State had cured its breach of the plea 
agreement. 
In any event, defendant has not alleged, much less shown that the trial court 
plainly erred when it sentenced defendant after the State had cured its breach of the plea 
agreement. Defendant has not shown (1) that an error occurred; (2) that the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) that the error was prejudicial. See State v. 
Casey, 2003 UT 55, If 41, 82 P.3d 1106. 
1. Where defendant has not argued "exceptional circumstances" or "plain 
error" to justify review of his unpreserved claim, this Court should decline to 
consider it on appeal. 
Where an appellant has waived an issue and "does not argue that 'exceptional 
circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies a review of the issue," this Court may decline to 
consider it on appeal. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) 
(citation omitted). 
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As stated, defendant did not preserve his claim below. Moreover, he does not 
argue on appeal that "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" justify review of the 
claim. This Court should therefore decline to consider the claim on appeal. 
2. Defendant has not shown that the trial court erred. 
Defendant bases his claim of error on Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 
(1971), where the United States Supreme Court addressed a defendant's entitlement to 
the benefit of a plea bargain. In that case, a new prosecutor, replacing the prosecutor who 
had negotiated the plea, appeared for sentencing and recommended the maximum 
sentence. Id. at 259. When defense counsel objected on the ground that the State had 
promised to make no recommendation, the new prosecutor, "apparently ignorant of his 
colleague's commitment, argued that there was nothing in the record to support 
[Santobello's] claim of a promise." Id. The sentencing judge ended the discussion, 
stating that he was "not at all influenced by what the [prosecutor] sa[id]," and then 
imposed the maximum sentence. Id. 
The Supreme Court vacated the sentence, holding that "the interests of justice and 
appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in 
the negotiation of pleas of guilty" required remand. Id. at 262. The court ordered the 
state court to determine "whether the circumstances of [the] case require[d] only that 
there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case [Santobello] 
should be resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in the view of the state court, the 
circumstances require[d] granting the relief sought by [Santobello], i.e., the opportunity 
to withdraw his plea of guilty." Id. at 263. 
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Santobello involved no effort by the State to cure its breach of the plea bargain 
and is therefore distinguishable from this case. When the State cures its breach of a plea 
agreement, as it did in this case, the cure alters the significance of the breach. 
In State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, 95 P.3d 1203, this Court addressed a cured 
breach of a plea agreement. In Smit, the parties entered into a plea agreement, which 
included the State's promise "to recommend that any sentence imposed be suspended and 
that [Smit] be granted probation." 2004 UT App 222, \ 2. During the change of plea 
hearing, the court advised Smit "that it was not bound by the plea agreement and that it 
could sentence [him] to prison for up to five years." Id. at ^ J 3. 
At sentencing, the State recommended jail time, and Smit objected. Id. at ^ f 4. 
The court called a recess so that the parties could listen to tapes of the change of plea 
hearing. Id. When court reconvened, "the State withdrew its affirmative 
recommendation for jail." Id. The court observed, "'Apparently, the recommendation 
that was part of the agreement was that it was to impose no jail sentence." Id. The State 
responded, '"Correct."' Id. The court clarified its understanding of the bargain, stating 
that "it imposed the sentence 'under the impression that the State's recommendation was 
that [it] should not send [Smit] to jail—or to prison and [it] should not impose, as a 
condition of probation any jail sentence.'" Id. The court nevertheless imposed a 
suspended prison term, placed Smit on probation for thirty-six months, and sentenced 
him to ninety days in jail as part of his probation. Id. 
Smit then filed a motion to withdraw his plea, arguing that the State breached the 
plea agreement when it recommended jail time. Id. at «f 5. The trial court denied the 
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motion, concluding that the State had cured the breach by withdrawing its affirmative 
recommendation for jail. Id. at 15. At some point in the proceedings, whether at 
sentencing or in its ruling on the motion to withdraw, "the trial court stated that it was not 
influenced by the State's initial recommendation." Id. at 121. 
On appeal, the State in Smit conceded that its initial recommendation breached the 
plea agreement, but argued that "by promptly withdrawing its recommendation, it cured 
the breach." Id. at f 19. Smit argued "that the cure was ineffective because '[i]t was . . . 
insufficient to erase in the court's consciousness the State's real recommendation.'" Id. 
This Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion to withdraw the plea. The Court reasoned, "[T]he State cured its initial breach of 
the plea agreement...." Id. at 121. Observing that the trial court had stated that it was 
not influenced by the State's initial recommendation and noting that the only evidence 
potentially "supporting Defendant's argument that the trial court was influenced by the 
State's initial recommendation [was] the fact that the trial court imposed a sentence 
consistent with that [initially] suggested by the State," the Court held that there was "no 
evidence to support Defendant's contention that the trial court was influenced by the 
initial recommendation." Id. 
Smit controls here. In Smit, as in this case, the State recommended jail time, but 
withdrew that recommendation following the defendant's objection that it violated the 
plea agreement. By contrast, in Santobello, the State recommended jail time and stood 
by its recommendation in the face of defense counsel's objection that the 
recommendation violated the plea agreement. 
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Here, as in Smit, while the substitute prosecutor's initial recommendation may 
have violated the plea agreement, upon defense counsel's request that the court take 
judicial notice of the earlier prosecutor's promise to recommend probation, the substitute 
prosecutor concurred in defense counsel's representation of the initial plea agreement, 
withdrew his comments, and "ma[de] an affirmative recommendation of probation." 
R146 (December 6, 2004 Sentencing) at 27. Moreover, in this case, as in Srnit, the trial 
court clarified that its decision did not rest on the State's initial recommendation. The 
court explained, "Ordinarily I have been following recommendations, but in this instance 
I see a record of probably twenty or so situations where the defendant is involved in 
assault, battery, or some kind of abuse in his record." Id. at 28. Based on that record, the 
court continued, "I just don't feel that, regardless of what your agreement was with Mr. 
Sheffield,... my inclination would still be to sentence the defendant at this time to zero 
to five years in the state prison." Id. 
Defendant here received the benefit of his bargain. The State affirmatively 
recommended probation. R146:27. The trial court chose not to follow the 
recommendation, not because it was persuaded by the State's initial recommendation, but 
because the PSI presented an extensive record of violent criminal behavior. Thus, 
defendant is not entitled to resentencing before a different judge. 
3. Even assuming that error occurred, it could not have been obvious. 
Even assuming that error occurred, defendant has not shown that it was obvious. 
To show obviousness, defendant must show that the law was clear at the time of trial. 
State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^  6, 18 P.3d 1123; see also State v. Frausto, 2002 UT 
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App 259, f 22, 53 P.3d 486, cert denied, 63 P.3d 104; State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 
(Utah App. 1997). As explained above, Smit appears to be controlling law. Smit, decided 
six months before defendant's sentencing, holds that where the State cures its initial 
inadvertent breach of a plea bargain by withdrawing any recommendation inconsistent 
with the plea agreement, the trial court may still impose sentence. See Smit, 2004 UT 
App 222, at \ 21. Moreover, a trial court's imposition of "a sentence consistent with that 
suggested by the State" does not, by itself, "establish that the trial court was influenced 
by the State's recommendation." Id. 
Given this precedent, any error in proceeding to sentencing could not have been 
obvious. 
4. Defendant has not shown that any error was prejudicial. 
As stated, a trial court's imposition of "a sentence consistent with that suggested 
by the State" does not, by itself, "establish that the trial court was influenced by the 
State's recommendation." Id. Defendant has pointed to nothing more. Thus, defendant 
has not shown that any error was prejudicial. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT IT 
LACKED JURISDICTION TO REVIEW DEFENDANT'S POST-
APPEAL RULE 22(E) MOTION TO VACATE SENTENCE 
The trial court ruled that defendant's appeal deprived it of jurisdiction to hear his 
rule 22(e) motion. R139-40. Defendant claims that, despite the filing of his appeal, the 
trial court had jurisdiction address the motion. See Br. Appellant at 10. 
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A. Defendant chose to raise his breach-of-plea claim on appeal, thereby 
depriving the district court of jurisdiction. 
The trial court's ruling was proper. As a general rule, a trial court loses 
jurisdiction over the merits of a controversy once an appeal is perfected. See Saunders v. 
Sharp, 818 P.2d 574,477 (Utah App. 1991); Frost v. District Court, 83 P.2d 737 (Utah 
1938). Although the court may retain jurisdiction as to collateral issues, it loses 
jurisdiction with respect to the issues that affect the subject matter of the appeal. 
Saunders, 818 P.2d at 578; Epic Assoc, v. Wasatch Bank, 725 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 
1986). 
A defendant may bring a motion under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, to correct an illegal sentence "at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
However, although "a criminal defendant may challenge an illegal sentence at any time 
and in any forum," he does not have "the right to repeatedly challenge his . . . sentence on 
the same legal basis." State v. Clark, 913 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996). 
Defendant chose where to attack his sentence. He chose to attack the sentence in 
this Court when he filed his January 3, 2005 notice of appeal. His docketing statement, 
filed January 21, 2005, lists a single issue: "Did the prosecutor's breach of the plea 
agreement render [his] guilty plea involuntary, requiring its withdrawal, and/or 
resentencing before a different judge." Docketing Statement at 2. The trial court 
The court may, for instance, "retain jurisdiction to reassess costs, correct the 
record, enforce a judgment,... or preside over matters which are independent of and do 
not interfere with the subject matter of the appeal." Clark v. State, 727 N.E.2d 18,20 
(Ind. App. 2000). 
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therefore determined that it did not have jurisdiction to address the identical issue in the 
context of a rule 22(e) motion, where defendant had chosen to raise the issue on appeal. 
SteeR139-40. 
The trial court's ruling was proper. Defendant's choice to raise the breach-of-plea 
issue on appeal deprived this Court of jurisdiction to address the same issue in the context 
of a rule 22(e) motion. Cf Clark, 913 P.2d at 362 (holding that a defendant may not 
"repeatedly challenge his or her sentence on the same basis" and holding that defendant 
could not bring a rule 22(e) motion to challenge a sentence on the basis of a claim earlier 
raised and adjudicated on appeal). Had the trial court ruled otherwise, the result may 
have been simultaneous adjudication of the issue in the district and appellate courts and 
successive appeals on the matter. 
B. Under rule 22(e), a court may correct only an illegal or illegally imposed 
sentence. Even assuming the sentence was imposed erroneously, it was not an 
illegal or illegally imposed sentence. 
In any case, the issue raised by defendant is not a claim properly brought under 
rule 22(e). Rule 22(e) provides that a "court may correct an illegal sentence, or a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." See State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, 
\ 5, 48 P.3d 228 (noting that "because an illegal sentence is void," a rule 22(e) claim 
"may be raised at any time") (citation and internal punctuation omitted). 
Further, "[w]hile rule 22(e) allows a court to review an illegal sentence at any 
time, it must be 'narrowly circumscribed' to prevent abuse." State v. Thorkelson, 2004 
UT App 9,115, 84 P.3d 854 (quoting State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, f 5, 48 P.3d 228). 
"The Utah Supreme Court has held that a rule 22(e) illegal sentence is a 'patently' illegal 
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sentence or a 'manifestly' illegal sentence." Id. (citing Telford, 2002 UT 51, ^ 5; State v. 
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995)). "A 'patently' or 'manifestly' illegal sentence 
generally occurs in one of two situations: (1) where the sentencing court has no 
jurisdiction, or (2) where the sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range." Id. 
(citing Telford, 2002 UT 51, Tj 5 n.l). 
However, where a sentence is neither illegal nor illegally imposed, a trial court has 
no jurisdiction to correct it under rule 22(e). Where a defendant claims "ordinary or 'run-
of-the-mill' error[]," his claims must be "reviewed on appeal under rule 4(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure." Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ^  15. 
Here, defendant's sentence was not subject to correction under rule 22(e). It was 
not "patently" or "manifestly" illegal. Because the trial court had jurisdiction to impose 
the sentence, the sentence was not imposed in an illegal manner. Because the sentence 
was within statutory parameters, the sentence was not illegal Thus, rule 22(e) "[could] 
not serve as a vehicle" for raising defendant's breach-of-plea claims. See Telford, 2002 
UT51,f 6. 
Rather, if the trial court erred by imposing sentence after the prosecutor had cured 
any breach of the plea bargain, the court's error was ordinary or "run of the mill" error, to 
be raised and addressed on appeal. Thus, the trial court, if it had any jurisdiction under 
rule 22(e), had jurisdiction only to determine that the alleged error was not "properly 
raised under rule 22(e)." Telford, 2002 UT 51, ffif 5-6. 
Moreover, this Court has jurisdiction only to dismiss defendant's appeal of the 
trial court's disposition of his motion to vacate. Where "the initial sentence [is] legal, the 
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district court los[es] subject matter jurisdiction over the sentence. Likewise, [the 
appellate] court has no jurisdiction. Lacking jurisdiction, [the appellate court is] required 
to dismiss the appeal." State v. McGuire, 2005 UT App 13, *2 (memorandum decision) 
(attached in the Addendum). 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18, If 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the 
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 
560 (Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided 
by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's conviction and dismiss his appeal of the trial 
court's disposition of his motion to vacate. 
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MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JEANNE B. INOUYE Q 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
class postage prepaid or hand-delivered two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to 
I hereby certify that on the b day of / f tMf t^ 20ty£l either mailed first-
appellant's counsel of record, as follows: 
ELIZABETH HUNT 
Elizabeth Hunt, L.L.C. 
569 Browning Ave. 
Salt Lake City, UT 841 
Counsel for Appellant 
'AJUWJL. 
B. INOUYE 
tant Attorney General 
MMUAA— 
21 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Westlaw; 
Not Reported in P.3d P a S e 1 
2005 WL 67585 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 13 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 67585 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Shawn C. McGUIRE, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20030418-CA. 
Jan. 13,2005. 
Third District, Salt Lake Department; The Honorable 
Paul G. Maughan. 
Joan C. Watt and Nisa J. Sisneros, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Matthew D. Bates, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Shawn C. McGuire appeals the sentence entered 
by the trial court. McGuire also appeals an order 
denying a motion to reconsider the sentence. 
McGuire pleaded guilty to operation of a clandestine 
laboratory, a first degree felony under the 
circumstances of this case. See Utah Code Ann. § § 
58-37d-4(1)(a), -5 (2004 Supp.). On August 12, 
2002, the trial court sentenced McGuire to an 
indeterminate term of "not less than five years and 
which may be life in the Utah State Prison." Rather 
than file an appeal, on August 13, 2002, McGuire 
filed a "motion to reconsider sentence." The motion 
was denied on April 1, 2003, on the basis that there 
were no grounds upon which to "reconsider" the 
sentence, and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
reconsider a legally imposed sentence. McGuire 
subsequently filed this appeal. 
An appeal must be filed within thirty days from the 
entry of a final judgment or order. See Utah R.App. 
P. 4. In a criminal case, it is "the sentence itself 
which constitutes a final judgment from which the 
appellant has the right to appeal." State v. Bower. 
2002 UT 100. ] 4, 57 P.3d 1065. The "30- day 
period for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case 
... is jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by this 
[cjourt." State v. Johnson. 635 P.2d 36. 37 (Utah 
1981). 
McGuire's notice of appeal was filed eight months 
after entry of the sentence by the trial court, long past 
the jurisdictional deadline. See Utah R.App. P. 4. 
However, McGuire argues that the time for filing an 
appeal was tolled in this case because McGuire filed 
a "motion to reconsider sentence" the day after the 
sentence was issued. JTN1J 
FN1. McGuire argues that the "motion to 
reconsider" the sentence was actually a 
motion to "alter or amend the judgment" 
under rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, thereby tolling the time for 
appeal under rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. See Utah R.App. P. 
4(b). McGuire's attempt to categorize his 
"motion to reconsider" the sentence as a 
motion under rule 59 is unavailing because 
rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure specifically applies to sentences. 
See Utah R. Crim P. 22: Utah R. Civ. P. 
81(e) ("These rules of procedure shall also 
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings 
where there is no other applicable statute or 
rule...."). The fact that a remedy under rule 
22(e) is extremely limited does not alter this 
outcome. 
Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. State v, 
Montova, 825 P.2d 676. 679 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
However, rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides a mechanism by which a 
defendant may attack "an illegal sentence, or a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." 
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e). McGuire sought 
reconsideration of the sentence which was imposed 
after his guilty plea was entered in this case. Giving 
McGuire the benefit of the doubt, his motion to 
reconsider his sentence may be construed as a motion 
pursuant to rule 22(e). See Montova, 825 P.2d at 679. 
The district court's jurisdiction over the resentencing 
turns on whether the initial sentence was legal. Id 
(citing State v. Babbell 813 P.2d 86. 88 (Utah 
1991)). Under Montoya, this court must "determine 
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whether the initial sentence was valid. If it was valid, 
the trial court would have had no further subject 
matter jurisdiction to resentence [defendant]. 
Likewise, this court would have no jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal." Id. 
An illegal sentence under rule 22(e) must be 
"patently" or "manifestly" illegal. State v. 
Thorkelson. 2004 UT App 9,f 15, 84 P.3d 854. "A 
'patently1 or 'manifestly' illegal sentence generally 
occurs in one of two situations: (1) where the 
sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or (2) where 
the sentence is beyond the authorized statutory 
range." Id. McGuire's challenge to his sentence does 
not fall under either situation. Instead, McGuire 
challenges the decision of the trial court to deny 
probation and sentence him to prison, a decision that 
is "within the complete discretion of the trial court." 
State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048. 1049 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991). As in Thorkelson, the error alleged by 
McGuire involves an "ordinary or 'run-of-the-mill' 
error regularly reviewed on appeal under rule 
4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." 
Thorkelsoiu 2004 UT App 9 at 11 15. [FN21 There is 
no showing that there was anything illegal about 
McGuire's sentence. 
FN2. Moreover, there is no showing that the 
trial court abused its discretion, let alone 
entered an "illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner[.]" Utah 
R.Crim. P. 22(e). 
*2 Jurisdiction to resentence McGuire would require 
an illegality in the initial sentence. Because the initial 
sentence was legal, the district court lost subject 
matter jurisdiction over the sentence. See Montova, 
825 P.2d at 680. Likewise, this court has no 
jurisdiction. See id. Lacking jurisdiction, we are 
required to dismiss the appeal. See Loffredo v. Holt, 
2001 UT97,f lL37P.3d 1070. 
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
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